The auctionLive V1
Anti-gaming provisions
Last-look, Sybil quoting, collusion, wash trades: the threat catalog and what answers each one.
A market is a target. The design assumes every participant will probe it, and each provision below exists because a specific attack would otherwise pay. The catalog, threat by threat:
| threat | the attack | the answer |
|---|---|---|
| last look | quote aggressively, then refuse fills you dislike | quotes are firm signed commitments; reneging is a slashable fault with escalating penalties |
| inflated claims | advertise latency or quality you do not deliver | the score only uses router-measured TTFT and audited quality; claims never enter it |
| model substitution | bid a 70B, serve a quantized 8B | canary probes, sampled audits, and points-staked challenges; see Market integrity |
| Sybil quoting | flood the book with fake identities to steer clearing | staked collateral per identity and a probationary tier for new providers |
| collusion | providers coordinate to lift the clearing price | sealed bids, hidden rival identities, second-score clearing, and published clearing statistics that expose drift |
| self-dealing | wash-trade your own quotes to farm points or reserves | reserve hardening and wash detection on the settlement records |
| provider groups | one operator behind several provider identities | declared groups with group-aware clearing, so shared control cannot fake competition |
| hold-up in sessions | hold a loop's cache, then reprice it | the locked tariff: nothing bid mid-session changes what the incumbent is paid; see Sessions |
The design stance
Notice the pattern. None of these answers is a terms-of-service clause. Each one changes the payoff so the attack loses money: measured inputs make claims worthless, second-score makes shading pointless, staking makes substitution ruinous. Rules that need a referee break at scale; incentives do not.
As a customerYou inherit all of this without configuring anything. The price you clear at was formed under sealed bids and published statistics.
As a providerThe provisions protect honest providers most of all: a rival cannot beat you with claims, floods, or refusals, only with a genuinely cheaper machine.
where this lives in code
- designs/omnious.md anti-gaming provisions, section 4.3
- designs/market-integrity-plan.md the eight-threat hardening backlog